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Abstract
We link banking and asset prices in a simple monetary macroeconomic model. Our main in-
novation is to consider how wide-spread default aﬀects the banking system. We ﬁnd that the
interaction of credit, asset prices, and loan losses explains a complete spectrum of outcomes,
including ﬁnancial extremes for which separate theories were thought to apply.
When fundamentals deteriorate, an asset price decline causes default among leveraged ﬁrms, and
banks suﬀer loan losses. Their size determines whether a capital crunch, ﬁnancial instability, or
a banking crisis occurs. But self-fulﬁlling capital crunches and banking crises are also possible
when loan losses force a credit contraction that feeds back onto asset prices.
This model, unlike others, distinguishes between ﬁnancial and macroeconomic stability, and
derives explicit solutions and balance sheet eﬀects even far from the steady state. It is applied
to Japan’s Lost Decade and to the US Great Depression. It also sheds light on the role of asset
prices in monetary policy, and on the procyclical eﬀect of capital adequacy requirements.
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Appendix 431 Introduction
Motivation. The essence of central banking lies in the pursuit of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial
stability.1 There are complete models of macroeconomic stability, and a reasonably broad consensus
on how to achieve it. Not so for ﬁnancial stability. There is no widely accepted model, much less a
consensus on how to achieve it - even the deﬁnition is a matter of debate. This is disturbing, given
the frequency with which ﬁnancial instability has befallen the world in the last 25 years, often with
devastating productive and redistributive consequences.2
This paper extends the reach of macroeconomics to ﬁnancial instability in a very simple and explicit
way. We depart from Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) model of credit cycles. They consider leveraged
ﬁrms, and how their exposure to asset prices generates macroeconomic dynamics. We believe that
taking the route of leverage and asset prices is even more promising for understanding ﬁnancial
stability, the other dimension of central banking.3
To push the theory in this direction, we focus on a new element: losses to the ﬁnancial system.
To do so, we integrate a banking system. Our main innovation is to allow for wide-spread default
among bank borrowers following a decline in asset prices. We then ask how loan losses aﬀect the
banking system, and how the state of the banking system in turn aﬀects the economy. We ﬁnd that
the interaction of credit, asset prices, and loan losses provides a uniﬁed approach for explaining
capital crunches, ﬁnancial instability, and banking crises.
In spite of their empirical relevance, loan losses have not previously been endogenized. They
measure the transfer of losses from defaulting borrowers to the banking system. Being themselves
indebted, banks cannot absorb them indeﬁnitely. Loan losses of a certain size constrain bank
lending [capital crunch]; larger losses cause an unstable contraction of credit [ﬁnancial instability],
which propels the system toward insolvency [banking crisis]. At that point, the credit and payment
mechanisms cease to function.
The emphasis we place on banking and balance sheets is uncommon in macroeconomics. This kind
of analysis is important because macroeconomics has contributed rather little to the policy debates
on ﬁnancial instability that have engaged central banks and international ﬁnancial institutions.
This is because macroeconomic models typically (a) ignore banking, (b) avoid the issue of default,
and (c) analyze mostly the neighborhood of the steady state.4 By overcoming these limitations,
our analysis shows that ﬁnancial instability can be analyzed within a simple macroeconomic model.
1Macroeconomic stability refers to the stability of the price level and of output. Financial stability refers to the
smooth, uninterrupted operation of both credit and payment mechanisms. (This succinct deﬁnition is taken from
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2002). Central banks supervise and typically operate the payment system, along
with lending of last resort facilities. They also assume responsibility for the overall stability of the ﬁnancial system,
even when the regulation and supervision of ﬁnancial institutions rests with other authorities. See Fry et al (1999),
chapter 6, and Brealey et al. (2001), chapter 2.
2For instance, no macroeconomic model captures the non-performing loans problem that has plagued Japan for a
decade, following the bursting of the asset price bubble.
3Leverage and falling asset prices are the main concepts around which Kindleberger (1996) organized his famous
history of ﬁnancial crises. These concepts have taken every opportunity in the recent past to reassert themselves.
4This technical limitation applies to dynamic general equilibrium models that rely on linearization.
1Set-up. The model is a ﬂexible-price overlapping generations model with three main features.
First, asset prices play a central role, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Second, a banking
system arises to intermediate payments between ﬁrms and households, as in McAndrews and
Roberds (1999). Finally, the banking system operates under a capital constraint, such as the
minimum capital requirements established by the 1988 Basel Accord.
We set up the following experiment. Firms purchase productive assets on bank credit. Next
period, they resell them to the new generation of ﬁrms, and sell their output at the current price
level. While undisturbed, the economy perpetuates itself in steady state. We then let an adverse
productivity shock set oﬀ dynamics. The forward-looking asset price falls to reﬂect the reduced
return on assets, and old ﬁrms suﬀer an unexpected loss on assets sold. The resulting wealth eﬀect
also reduces consumption spending, and the price level falls (see diagram below). Deﬂation and
asset price decline together threaten the solvency of old ﬁrms: they had incurred debt expecting to
sell goods and assets at continued steady state prices. For large enough shocks, wide-spread default
among ﬁrms becomes inevitable. We then ask:
(1) How do losses aﬀect the banking system?
(2) How does the state of the banking system in turn aﬀect the economy?
(3) What determines whether a capital crunch, ﬁnancial instability, or a banking crisis occurs?
Results. The model suggests the following answers.
(1) As fundamentals worsen, prices fall, and balance sheets deteriorate. The greater the adverse
shock, the lower the price level and asset prices relative to outstanding debt. The resulting losses
cascade down the debt structure: they ﬁrst reduce ﬁrms’ proﬁts; once ﬁrms default, further losses
reduce the banking system’s dividends and capital. Once those are zero too, the banking system is
insolvent, and any further losses are borne by depositors. In this ‘fundamental equilibrium’, there
is a unique mapping from worsening fundamentals to deteriorating balance sheets and economic
outcomes.
(2) When the banking system complies with a capital constraint, ﬁnancial instability and multiple
equilibria arise. The capital constraint closes the loop (see diagram). It generates feedback from
the banking system to the economy, because any fall in bank capital, due to loan losses, translates
into a multiple contraction of credit. This depresses asset prices and accelerates loan losses, which

















A threshold now splits the space of fundamentals. An economy with weak fundamentals suﬀers
ﬁnancial instability: unstable credit contraction propels the system toward a banking crisis. An
2economy with strong fundamentals may attain the fundamental equilibrium, but self-fulﬁlling cap-
ital crunches and banking crises are also possible. Therefore, the mapping from fundamentals to
outcomes is no longer unique when the banking system reacts to loan losses by reducing credit.
Loan losses, not necessarily fundamentals, decide whether a capital crunch, ﬁnancial instability, or
a banking crisis occurs.
(3) Each phenomenon is triggered by a threshold asset price decline determined by the economy’s
structural features, including leverage. Leverage increases an economy’s vulnerability, because a
given asset price decline produces greater losses. While leverage is essential for ﬁnancial instability,
deﬂation and recessions are not. Macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability are distinct, but not inde-
pendent. We show that they tend to reinforce each other, but either one may also occur alone. In













Related literature. This appears to be the ﬁrst model to characterize a complete spectrum of
outcomes between the steady state and a systemic banking crisis. Separate theories exist for each
range. The ﬁrst range (’wealth eﬀects only’) is captured by the ﬁnancial accelerator.5 Much
empirical evidence supports the view that balance sheet variables, mainly cash ﬂow and net worth,
aﬀect investment (Hubbard 1998). The ﬁnancial accelerator aggregates these balance sheet eﬀects to
produce business cycle dynamics. While sharing the emphasis on balance sheets in a macroeconomic
context, our model focuses less on borrowers, and more on the banking system.6 The ﬁnancial
accelerator conﬁnes itself to small balance sheet variations.7 As such, the theory stops short of
addressing the extremes that had motivated its development. Debt deﬂation, ﬁnancial instability,
and banking crises were explored in the empirical and narrative accounts of Bernanke (1983),
Mishkin (1991, 1999), and Calomiris (1993, 1995). They found, inter alia, that falling asset values
may impair borrowers’ balance sheets to the point of interrupting the intermediation of credit,
which in turn exacerbates macroeconomic conditions. This is the two-way causation we study here
(questions (1) and (2) above). We allow borrowers’ net worth to fall until default occurs. From this
perspective, our paper attempts to extend the ﬁnancial accelerator to the space beyond default.
5The main contributions are Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990, 1999); Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993); Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997); and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
6The concept of ‘ﬁnancial fragility’ (Bernanke and Gertler 1990) is about borrowers’ net worth and investment,
hence output and, ultimately, macroeconomic stability. Our concept of ﬁnancial instability is about the intermediation
of credit and payments.
7The formal theory quantiﬁes the marginal contribution of balance sheet variables to business cycle dynamics. Cor-
respondingly, (a) linearization is employed, and (b) the issue of default is either ruled out, (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997),
or made inconsequential for diversiﬁed lenders (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1999).
3The second range in the diagram ends in a capital crunch. The empirical evidence from New
England and Japan outweighs the few models that address this problem. They provide better
microfoundations for bank capital, but a poorer treatment of loan losses, than does our model.
Some papers take falling bank capital as exogenous (Bernanke and Gertler 1987, Holmstr¨ om and
Tirole 1997, and Chen 2001), or as unrelated to loan losses (Blum and Hellwig 1995, Gorton and
Winton (2000), Freixas and Bolton 2001). Others do consider loan losses, but do not relate them to
any borrowers (Rajan 1994, van den Heuvel 2002), or to any endogenous macroeconomic variables
(Gersbach 2002). By contrast, the macroeconomic endogeneity of loan losses, hence that of bank
capital, is central to our approach. From that perspective, our paper attempts to endogenize loan
losses, a key cause of capital crunches, within a macroeconomic framework.
The ﬁnal range in the diagram ends in a banking crisis. Banking crises have almost exclusively
been analyzed in terms of the microeconomics of bank runs. A vast literature builds on the idea that
liquidity-providing demand deposits make banks prone to runs: the existence and fragility of banks
are then simultaneously explained, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Allen and Gale (1998), and
Diamond and Rajan (2001).8 To the extent that bank assets are modelled at all, their deterioration
is taken as exogenous. Our approach relates bank assets to ﬁrms, and to the macroeconomic factors
that govern their ﬁnancial condition. We think that doing so has empirical advantages. First, the
deterioration of bank assets through non-performing loans is characteristic of banking distress, as
reﬂected in the list of 168 crises compiled by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). Second, a banking
system can be in distress even when bank runs are not a problem, as in the case of Japan (see
section 5.1).9 Even the classic banking panics are being revised in the light of new evidence on the
fundamental deterioration of bank assets (section 5.2). Bank runs are perhaps better viewed as a
symptom, rather than the cause, of ﬁnancial instability. From that perspective, our paper attempts
to provide an asset-based explanation of banking distress.
The model’s main appeal is its simplicity. Yet it articulates all the links depicted on page 2 and
generates a complete spectrum of outcomes. In spite of dynamic general equilibrium, explicit solu-
tions and balance sheet eﬀects are found without resorting to linearization.10 This is made possible
by the overlapping generations structure (which minimizes persistence following default), and by
our inside money approach to banking. This approach is considerably simpler than the alternatives
in monetary economics, because the credit apparatus is frictionless until low bank capital interferes
with the elastic provision of credit. It has the further advantage of being consistent with basic
payment system facts, and with the determination of the money supply by credit counterparts.
Applications. Two case studies and two central banking policy debates illustrate possible uses of
the model. Japan’s Lost Decade (1990s) can be understood in terms of our characterization of a
8Useful surveys appear in Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Freixas and Rochet (1997), and deBandt and Hart-
mann (2000).
9The last systemic banking panics in the US and UK took place in 1933 and 1866, respectively. Deposit insurance
and lending of last resort are almost universal today.
10This contrasts not only with the ﬁnancial accelerator, discussed above, but also with general equilibrium models
with incomplete markets (GEI). The GEI paradigm takes a more complete, but far more complex, approach to
integrating default and ﬁnancial instability. See Dubey et al. (2000), and Tsomocos (2002), respectively.
4capital crunch. The model helps explain where the ‘non-performing loans problem’ came from, and
how it undermined the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy (see Ueda 2003). The US Great Depression
(1929-33) is an example of ﬁnancial instability ending in a banking crisis. The model suggests
a fundamental explanation for observed bank runs, and captures the collapse of intermediation
(Bernanke 1983).
Regarding monetary policy, we show that a central bank mindful of ﬁnancial stability may react to
asset prices, (only) when their decline exceeds a threshold determined by the economy’s leverage.
Only a timely interest rate cut is likely to be successful, if it coordinates the banking system
on the fundamental equilibrium. Regarding regulatory policy, we show that capital adequacy
requirements can have a strong procyclical eﬀect on the economy. Nevertheless, removing capital
adequacy regulation might well exacerbate procyclicality.
The model can be applied to these issues because it distinguishes between macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial stability. The latter primarily depends on asset prices and loan losses. Their eﬀect on
the banking system is highly non-linear around certain thresholds, which depend on the structural
features of the economy. Our modelling of balance sheets and thresholds compares to the stress
testing exercises conducted at central banks and international ﬁnancial institutions to assess risks
to ﬁnancial stability.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model for the perfect foresight case.
Section 3 introduces a shock and determines the fundamental equilibrium. Section 4 adds the
capital constraint, explores capital crunches and ﬁnancial instability, and performs comparative
statics. Finally, section 5 presents the applications and concludes.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 Set-up
The model is an ﬂexible-price, inﬁnite-horizon non-stochastic general equilibrium model with real
assets and consumption goods. There are overlapping generations of ﬁrms and households, each of
unit measure, and a banking system intermediating between them (see ﬁgure 1, page 9). Households
are the lenders in this economy; they solve a standard intertemporal consumption problem, and their
Euler equation will govern the price level. Firms use real assets to produce and sell consumption
goods; the productivity of their technology will govern the asset price. The banking system arises
to help households and ﬁrms attain their optimal pattern of exchange by intermediating their
payments. Firms and banks are modelled as separate from households, consuming their proﬁts
and dividends, respectively.11 Aggregate demand will be the sum of spending by households, ﬁrms’
proﬁts, and bank dividends.
11This simple ownership structure makes sure that (a) borrowing takes place, and that (b) loan losses and bank
capital structure matter. This would not necessarily be so if (a) ﬁrms were owned by households (production and
consumption would be internalized), or if (b) banks were owned by ﬁrms or by households.
5(1) Firms
Firms are run by owner-entrepreneurs, and are arranged around the unit circle. The entrepreneur








t = Πt. (1)
Hence the entrepreneur maximizes proﬁts. The typical ﬁrm of generation t − 1 transforms capital
and labor into consumption goods, sold next period for pt (the price level). Labor consists of
the entrepreneur’s endowment l, and capital consists of real assets, such as real estate (land and
buildings).12 The production function is standard neoclassical with a unit total factor productivity
coeﬃcient, yt = f(ht−1). As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), production uses real assets and takes
time. In contrast to their model, however, we let ﬁrms choose their ﬁrst-best plan (no borrowing
constraint), and let ﬁnancial arrangements arise to accommodate their credit and payment needs.
The ﬁrm therefore maximizes the unconstrained problem
max
ht−1
Πt = ptf(ht−1) − at−1ht−1 (2)
where at−1 is the cost of holding assets, speciﬁed below. Equating this cost to the marginal revenue




With a unit measure of identical price-taking ﬁrms, hd
t−1 also denotes aggregate asset demand (only
ﬁrms will hold assets). Assets are in ﬁxed supply H and do not depreciate. Market clearing then
determines the cost of holding assets,
at−1H = αpty (3)
where y ≡ f(H) is aggregate output, and α ≡ f0(H)H
y is output elasticity.13 In present value terms,
ﬁrms plan to allocate the fraction α of (expected) future sales revenue pty to holding productive
assets; the remainder is paid out as proﬁts and spent on consumption,
Πt = (1 − α)pty. (4)
Proﬁts are the implicit wage for the entrepreneur’s speciﬁc labor.14 In aggregate, the fractions α
and (1 − α) of revenue, pty, are the shares of national income paid to the factors of production.
We now turn to the ﬁnancial implications of ﬁrms’ optimal allocation. Suppose for a moment that
assets were rented, and paid for after use. Firms would then ﬁnance assets entirely out of their
12The entrepreneur’s labor is speciﬁc to the project, and no outside labor is employed. The constant l is subsumed
in the production function.
13Both are constant because assets in ﬁxed supply are the only variable factor of production.
14We allow for positive proﬁts, because zero proﬁts would make ﬁrms overly prone to default (see (23) below).
Allowing positive proﬁts amounts to α < 1. With the additional (weak) condition α > R − 1, we impose a lower
bound on the marginal productivity of assets.
6sales revenue in t. There would be no need for borrowing in t − 1, no debt, no banks, and no
vulnerability to asset prices – a poor environment for studying ﬁnancial instability.
Assumption 1 (Borrowing). Firms must purchase the assets they use in production.
The absence of a rental market creates a mismatch in cash ﬂows.15 It forces ﬁrms to borrow, before
production takes place, the full market value of assets bt−1 = qt−1H. Next period, they repay their
debt after selling output y and assets H,
qt−1H = bt−1
Πt + Rt−1bt−1 = qtH + pty (5)
where Rt−1 > 1 is the gross nominal interest rate between t−1 and t. Combining (4) with (5) gives
(Rt−1qt−1 − qt)H = αpty. (6)
Comparison with (3) shows that assumption 1 makes the cost of holding assets at−1 = Rt−1qt−1−qt.
The right hand side is what Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) call user cost. It is a small fraction of the
purchasing price qt−1 because assets, unlike goods, can be resold after use. (This gives ﬁrms the


















j=0 Rt+j. As in q-theory, the value of assets is the discounted stream of future
marginal revenue products associated with their use.
(2) Households
Alongside ﬁrms, there are overlapping generations of households, treated as an inﬁnitely-lived
dynasty (Barro 1974). Households derive utility from consuming goods. They are endowed at
date 0 with all H assets. They could run their own production, but it is much less eﬃcient than
ﬁrms’: g(h) ≤ εf(h), where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small, and g0(0) < f0(H). Households therefore
have little productive use for assets; they will sell them to the ﬁrst generation of ﬁrms.16
15An incomplete contracts approach would indicate that ownership dominates renting when the entrepreneur’s
human capital is essential (Hart 1995, chapter 2). Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) also rule out renting, but for reasons
speciﬁc to their set-up (fn. 8).
16Since households do not rent them out (assumption 1), they would only use assets in equilibrium if these appre-
ciated at (close to) the rate of interest; but a user cost of zero is inconsistent with ﬁrms’ ﬁnite demand necessary for
equilibrium. Households run their own production only if intertemporal exchange breaks down (autarky).
7Households then solve a standard intertemporal consumption problem, with initial wealth q0H
given by (8). Let st denote their spending on consumption (st ≡ ptch
t ), and Dt ﬁnancial wealth
carried over to the next period,
s0 + D0 = q0H
st + Dt = Rt−1Dt−1 ∀t ≥ 1. (9)











Households are the lenders in this economy; they do not run down their wealth (u0(0) = ∞). The
slope of optimal consumption is given by their Euler equation,
u0(ch





In steady state it must be the case that R = β−1, the interest rate equals the inverse rate of time-
preference. Optimal consumption spending then equals s = (R−1)D, the permanent income from
wealth D = q0H/R. To specify how households deviate from this perpetuity rule outside steady
state, we posit time-separable CRRA utility u(c) = c1−γ−1
1−γ and consider Rt = β−1 (see assumption








(3) The Banking System
We now consider how a banking system arises to help households and ﬁrms attain their optimal
plans by intermediating their payments. Note ﬁrst that eﬃciency requires that the stock of assets
H be passed down successive generations of ﬁrms for productive use, as shown in ﬁgure 1.
This raises a payments problem: households only give up H at date 0 in exchange for a claim on
the output of all future generations of ﬁrms, since they wish to consume every period, see (10).
While this could be achieved by renting H out every period, renting was ruled out by assumption 1.
Firms need to borrow, ultimately from households, to purchase the assets. But the value of such
borrowing exceeds the value of ﬁrms’ output.17 To repay households, ﬁrms depend on the proceeds
from selling assets to the next generation of ﬁrms, which also needs to borrow from households.
The circulation of ﬁrms’ debt (IOUs) could in principle overcome the payments problem. That,
however, requires the collection and clearing of an inﬁnity of IOUs, within and across all generations
17The value of assets exceeds that of output because assets produce every period’s output. See footnote 14 and
equation (16) below.
8of ﬁrms, which poses a formidable organizational challenge.
Figure 1: Intertemporal Exchange
Date 0 1 2 3 ...
Households u u u u u
generation 0 u u Firms
generation 1 u u












Assumption 2 (Clearing). Households and ﬁrms ﬁnd it too costly to clear against each
other ﬁrms’ IOUs.18 As a result, the circulation of ﬁrms’ IOUs cannot overcome the payments
problem, even if IOUs are enforceable. In view of the ineﬃciency of autarky, one should expect
some institution to arise. The following result determines the nature of this institution.
Proposition 1 Banking
(Only) a deposit banking system overcomes the payments problem.
Proof: Assume initially that ﬁrms’ IOUs are enforceable. Let the institution collect ﬁrms’ IOUs and
issue a non-circulating liability of equal value (‘deposits’). All transactions can now be conducted
in terms of this liability on the institution’s balance sheet (see appendix C).19 Every period t,
the institution creates deposits worth qtH for new ﬁrms, enabling them to purchase the assets by
transferring the balance to old ﬁrms. Old ﬁrms use these deposits to reduce their existing debt with
the institution to Rt−1qt−1H − qtH. This balance is repaid using sales revenue pty, which leaves
proﬁts Πt consistent with (5).20 Going backward, the ﬁrst payment q0H is received by the initial
sellers of assets (households), who hold their wealth on deposit to ﬁnance their spending st every
period. The institution overcomes the payments problem, since all transactions are feasible and
consistent with (5) and (9) for all t ≥ 0. The institution can be characterized as a deposit banking
system, because (a) its assets consist of loans to ﬁrms (ﬁrms’ IOUs), (b) its liabilities consist of
18The literature on payment systems makes similar assumptions, based on spatial separation (Freeman 1996,
Green 1997) or limited legal recourse (McAndrews and Roberds 1999).
19Assumption 2 does not apply with equal force to the banking system: interposing itself as a counterparty to all
transactions substantially simpliﬁes clearing, because it is now conducted in terms of a single liability, deposits.
20Sales revenue includes the proﬁt spent by the neighboring ﬁrm. To visualize this, think of ﬁrm i borrowing Πt to
purchase the output from the neighboring ﬁrm i+1. This allows ﬁrm i+1 to cancel its debt, leaving Πt to spend on
ﬁrm i + 2 output, and so on. The circle is closed, and the initial Πt is repaid, when ﬁrm i − 1 has purchased output
from ﬁrm i.
9deposits, used as the means of payment in the economy, and (c) its deposits are held (carried over
to the next period) by households: the banking system combines the functions of payment system
and credit intermediary.
Appendix B deﬁnes strategic default and shows that it cannot be prevented by arrangements with
circulating liabilities (bank notes or ﬁat money). Deposit banking, by contrast, takes advantage
of its command over the payment system to enforce ﬁrms’ debt. Hence, only deposit banking
overcomes the payments problem. •
In other overlapping generations models, outside money (Samuelson 1958), or private IOUs (Sargent
and Wallace 1982), overcome the payments problem; here deposit banking does. Our notion of
banking is closest to McAndrews and Roberds’s (1999) analysis of overdrafts. In both models the
banking system has an advantage in payment intermediation, which is conducted by transfer of
bank deposits. By granting credit, the banking system creates inside money by counterpart. This,
we believe, provides a better description of developed monetary systems than do the cash-or-barter
models that dominate monetary macroeconomics.21 Credit here is perfectly elastic, in the sense that
ﬁrms can borrow any amount of deposits consistent with their life-time wealth. Banking removes
the clearing friction for which it arose, and strategic default can be prevented: the model reverts
to frictionless. Therefore, in contrast to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), borrowing is not constrained
by the future market value of assets: ﬁrms can also pledge their future sales revenue in (5). In
other words, the cash-in-advance constraint implicit in assumption 1 is not distorting. We close
this section with two assumptions.
Assumption 3 (Lending). Deposits and loans are standard debt, paying a nominal
interest rate of R = β−1. The use of standard debt (non-contingent until default) is pervasive
in reality, and natural in our context of payment intermediation.22 The ﬁxed nominal interest
rate R = β−1 can be thought of as a policy rule; it is supported by the elasticity of credit (see
footnotes 21, 26). Credit remains perfectly elastic as long as bank lending remains unconstrained
by bank capital (section 4 addresses the constrained case).
21McAndrews and Roberds (1999) identify payment intermediation as the original, and still vital, function of banks.
Cash transactions today account for less than 1% of the value of payments in the US (Hancock and Humphrey 1998).
Nevertheless, macroeconomic models almost exclusively work with ﬁat money. Contemporary banking theory (fol-
lowing Diamond and Dybvig 1983, and Diamond 1984) does not view deposits as a means of payment, and does not
consider that deposits can be supplied elastically by the system as a whole (see footnote 41).
Goodhart emphasizes that bank credit, in reality, is made elastic by institutional construction, because central banks
guarantee access to reserves at the chosen oﬃcial short-term rate, which in turn allows commercial banks to make loans
freely available to qualiﬁed borrowers (e.g. Goodhart 2003, p.1). Elastic credit is a common theme in several strands
of the monetary literature, including the Banking School (1840s especially), pure credit economy (Wicksell 1907),
credit cycles (Hawtrey 1919), inside money (Gurley and Shaw 1960, chapter 7), free banking (Selgin 1988), Gold
Standard (Calomiris and Hubbard 1989), and post-Keynesian economics (Moore 1988). Hicks (1967, 1989 chapters
5-7), and Black (1970) describe a credit economy with banking similar to ours. Few formal models, however, identify
elastic credit with banking; they include work on overdrafts (McAndrews and Roberds 1999), on private bank note
issue (Champ et al. 1996), and on payment systems (McAndrews and Roberds 1995, Freeman 1996 and Green 1997).
22Following assumption 2, it is likely that the complexity of clearing is minimized when the means of payment
is standard debt. See also Freeman (1996), Green (1997) and McAndrews and Roberds (1999). More generally,
standard debt could also be justiﬁed in terms of optimal risk-sharing, because households here are risk averse, whereas
entrepreneurs and banks are risk neutral. Finally, explanations based on asymmetric information are proposed in
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), and Townsend (1979) and Diamond (1984).
10Assumption 4 (Bank Capital). The banking system has K = s0 worth of bank capi-
tal. We can imagine a banking system endowed with αβy goods, sold in period 0 at p0 = 1 to
households.23 This explanation of bank capital is little more than deﬁnitional; it simply states
that to become bank owners they must initially give up some consumption (further discussion in
section 5.4). The bank balance sheet, recorded at the close of markets each period, now consists of
loans, deposits, and capital,
A Bank Balance Sheet L
qtH Dt
Kt
The balance sheet identity Kt ≡ qHt − Dt shows that the banking system earns a return of R on
capital. Bank capital evolves as Kt = RKt−1 − Divt. For simplicity, suppose the banking system
follows the dividend policy of paying out its proﬁts each period.24 Absent loan losses,
Divt = (R − 1)Kt−1, (12)
and bank capital remains constant at Kt = K. Bank owners spend their dividends, like ﬁrm owners
spend their proﬁts, on consumption.
Remarks. Note that the size of the bank balance sheet at all times equals the value of the asset
market qtH. This correspondence is natural in an economy whose asset market so heavily relies
on bank credit. Any constraint on the size of the bank balance sheet, such as low bank capital,
will reduce credit availability and thereby depress asset prices. Note also that the banking system
combines both credit and payment mechanisms, hence its stability is equivalent to ﬁnancial stability
as deﬁned on page 1. These considerations become essential in section 4.
2.2 Perfect Foresight Equilibrium
Asset market equilibrium is obtained from (6),








23Since ﬁrms only start selling their production at date 1, households will spend s0 of their deposits to purchase
the banking system’s endowment. The banking system thereby acquires a deposit claim on itself, which constitutes
bank capital. (Gorton and Winton (1995) provide a micro-founded analysis of optimal capital at the ‘beginning of
the world’). Assuming p0 = 1 is no more arbitrary than assuming a ﬁxed quantity of unbacked ﬁat money (see also
footnote 26).
24In steady state, such a dividend policy is necessary for bank capital to remain constant.
11Goods market equilibrium is obtained from equating the value of aggregate supply with aggregate
demand, the sum of spending by households, ﬁrms’ proﬁts and bank dividends,25
pty = st + Πt + Divt ∀t ≥ 1. (14)
A perfect foresight equilibrium is a sequence of endogenous prices {pt,qt}∞
t=0, and choices
{ht,st,Πt+1,Divt+1}∞
t=0 such that, for given H, R = β−1, and p0 = 1,
– ﬁrms maximize (2), households maximize (10), and the banking system follows (12), and
– the asset market (13) and goods market (14) clear every period.
Proposition 2 Basic Economy
(a) The perfect foresight equilibrium is unique and stationary.
(b) Firms and the banking system are leveraged.
Proof: We connect goods market conditions with the Euler equation to show that the price level,
hence all other variables, are constant. Using (4), (12), and assumption 4, goods market equilibrium
becomes
st = αpty − (R − 1)K ∀t ≥ 1 (15)
s0 = αβy.
Substituting st and st+1 into the Euler equations (11) gives an expression of the form g(pt) = g (pt+1)
∀t ≥ 1. Since g( ) is monotonic, pt = pt+1 is the only solution: for γ ≥ 1, g0 (p) > 0 always; for
γ < 1, g0 (p) > 0 unless αpy − (R − 1)K < 0, which is ruled out by (15) because consumption
cannot be negative. Thus the price level p is constant from t = 1 onward and, using (15) in (11),





It follows that the choice variables {ht,st,Πt+1,Divt+1}∞
t=0 also remain constant.27
Regarding part (b), deﬁne leverage as debt relative to net worth. From (5), ﬁrms’ debt equals
25Goods are not storable; real supply equals y irrespective of prices.
26The price level normalization in assumption 4 can be justiﬁed with a reserve requirement. A central bank can
create and lend (non-circulating) reserves to the banking system, which holds them on deposit with the central bank.
(This transaction is not distorting when reserves are borrowed and lent at R). An exogenously supplied quantity of
reserves then limits deposits, hence bank assets. Since qH and p are related by (16), the reserve requirement can be
chosen to imply p = 1.
27The steady state allocation of assets and goods is
Allocation Firms Households Banking System
Assets H 0 0
Goods (1 − α)y αβy α(1 − β)y







The banking system’s debt is D = qH/R, given household spending s = (R − 1)D in (9). The





As both expressions exceed one, both ﬁrms and the banking system are leveraged. •
The economy starts in steady state and remains there, because the world looks identical looking
forward from any t. Firms are leveraged because they purchase and resell assets whose value
exceeds output and proﬁts. Firms’ leverage is increasing and convex in output elasticity: greater
α increases debt (numerator) while reducing proﬁts (denominator) through debt service. Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) also work with leveraged ﬁrms (p. 222). But their model ignores banking,
which arises here to help the economy attain the optimal allocation. The banking system is also
leveraged, because it intermediates a large value of credit and payments. High leverage is a deﬁning
characteristic of banking.
3 Fundamental Equilibrium with Default
Along a perfect foresight equilibrium, there can be no ﬁnancial instability. All future equilibrium
asset and goods prices are known. The banking system correctly factors agents’ budget constraints
into all lending decisions. As a result, there can be no loan losses, impaired bank capital, and
falling supply of credit. We now drop the perfect foresight assumption to study the consequences
of a shock relative to the perfect foresight benchmark. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) do so to study
macroeconomic dynamics, generated by asset prices interacting with borrowing constraints. We do
so to explore ﬁnancial instability, generated by asset prices interacting with loan losses.
Assumption 5 (Shock). An unexpected productivity shock permanently reduces total
factor productivity from t onward by τ ∈ [0,1].28 As production takes one period, the shock
reduces aggregate output from period t + 1 onward. The production technology becomes
yT+1 = (1 − τ)f(hT) for T ≥ t. (19)
This shock entails a new set of prices {pt,qt} through the following channels:
28The results are not speciﬁc to this type of shock: the same speciﬁcation allows alternative interpretations, (e.g.
τ could be a corporate tax increase), and some other speciﬁcations lead to similar results (e.g. an unexpected
payment due from ﬁrms to households). Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Allen and Gale (2000) also make use of
zero-probability shocks, because fully stochastic models make explicit solutions diﬃcult to obtain.
13(1) New ﬁrms (entering in t) pay less for assets, because assets are now less productive to them
and to all future ﬁrms.
(2) Old ﬁrms (exiting in t) therefore sell assets at a loss, qt < q. They also sell output at a
loss, pt < 1, if the fall in asset prices reduces aggregate spending through a wealth eﬀect.29 The
unexpected losses reduce old ﬁrms’ ability to repay debt RqH they had incurred in t−1, expecting
to sell goods and assets at continued steady state prices.
(3) If old ﬁrms default, bank loans are not repaid in full, and the banking system must write oﬀ
non-performing loans.
There are no further shocks after t, and the model reverts to perfect foresight. In this section we
elaborate the channels (1)-(3), and aggregate agents’ reactions to determine the new equilibrium
{pt+i(τ),qt+i(τ)}
∞
i=0. This experiment leads to falling prices relative to debt, and allows us to study
the eﬀect of wide-spread default on the banking system (question (1), introduction). We refer to
the equilibrium as fundamental: it is the inescapable consequence of the shock τ > 0. When the
capital constraint is added as a fourth channel, {pt+i,qt+i}
∞
i=0 can assume values independently of
τ, and self-fulﬁlling capital crunches and banking crises become possible (section 4).
3.1 Reactions to the Productivity Shock
(1) New Firms and Asset Prices
The typical ﬁrm of generation t now chooses the quantity of assets used in production to maximize
max
ht
Πt = pt+1 (1 − τ)f(ht) − (Rqt − qt+1)ht.
It remains optimal for each ﬁrm to spend the fraction α of sales revenue on holding H assets; the
remainder constitutes proﬁts. Therefore, aggregate proﬁts and asset market equilibrium are
Πt+1 = (1 − α)(1 − τ)pt+1y
α(1 − τ)pt+1y
| {z }
= (Rqt − qt+1)H. (20)
These expressions diﬀer from (4) and (13) only in as far as τ > 0 reduces future output. As before,
national income (braced) is distributed according to the factor shares (α remains unaﬀected by τ).
Conditional on future goods prices, lower productivity reduces the return on assets, and leads to
lower asset prices. Using (20) modiﬁes the asset pricing equation (13) to











29Their production y remains unaﬀected by the shock, because it was carried out during t − 1.
14where the latter anticipates that the new steady state is reached in t + 1, as shown below. The
comparison with (16) shows that qt falls to
qt = q (1 − τ)pt+1 ⇔ δ = 1 − (1 − τ)pt+1 (22)
where δ denotes the asset price decline in percent, δ ≡ (q − qt)/q.30 The fundamental asset price
decline would simply equal that of productivity, δ = τ, if the future price level pt+1 remained at
1. The asset price decline has two eﬀects: credit demand falls because assets are cheaper, and old
ﬁrms suﬀer a capital loss on the assets they sell.
(2) Old Firms and Debt Deﬂation
Old ﬁrms face the threat of debt deﬂation. In t−1 they had borrowed qH, assuming that in t they
would sell goods and assets at continued steady state prices {1,q}. Following the shock τ, a new
set of equilibrium prices {pt,qt} applies. Their debt is predetermined, but their ability to repay is
not: default becomes a possibility. Their budget constraints (5), ex post become
qH = b (predetermined)
Πt + (RqH − λ) = pty + qtH. (23)
The right hand side is ﬁrms’ ability to repay, shared between repayment and proﬁts. The new
term λ arises because ﬁrms enjoy limited liability Πt ≥ 0: their owners’ consumption (1) cannot be
negative. Should the ability to repay fall short of the their debt RqH, the measure λ of the debt
becomes non-performing to hold proﬁts at zero,
λ = max{0,RqH − (pty + qtH)} (24)
Πt = max{0,(pty + qtH) − RqH}. (25)
Figure 2 illustrates. Firms’ ability to repay is increasing in goods and asset prices (together,
‘prices’). In steady state, py + qH covers RqH, leaving Π in proﬁts (the double vertical line). As
prices fall, so do ﬁrms’ proﬁts Πt. While they can, ﬁrms repay in full. When prices fall below the
default point, ﬁrms default on λ and proﬁts remain at zero.
30Before t, the economy was still in steady state (qt−1 = q); δ measures the decline both relative to steady state,
and relative to last period.










































This convex payoﬀ proﬁle is typical for limited liability ﬁrms, and is often used for options pricing
of corporate debt, following Merton (1974). Here, we focus on how ﬁrms’ losses spill over to the
banking system. Comparing (23) with its value in steady state, y + qH, shows that unexpected
losses total
ω ≡ δqH + (1 − pt)y. (26)
They consist of the decline in the value of asset holdings (if δ > 0), plus lost sales revenue due to
deﬂation (if pt < 1). Steady state proﬁts Π measure ﬁrms’ ability to withstand unexpected losses.
Small losses (ω ≤ Π) are borne by ﬁrms alone: Π > Πt ≥ 0 and λ = 0. Larger losses (ω > Π) are
shared: ﬁrms bear Π and default; the banking system bears λ = ω − Π, which equals (24) above.
(3) The Banking System and Loan Losses
The main diﬀerence with other macroeconomic models is that we allow wide-spread default to
aﬀect the banking system.31 When markets open in t, the banking system holds K in capital, and
would normally earn (R − 1)K on loans, less deposits, carried over from t−1. As long as ﬁrms are
able to repay in full (λ = 0), normal proﬁts are paid out as dividends, Divt = (R − 1)K. Should
macroeconomic conditions be such that non-performing loans λ arise, then bank proﬁts fall by λ
given in (24). Non-performing loans must be written oﬀ, reducing both assets and liabilities by λ
(see appendix C).32 How does this aﬀect dividends and bank capital?
31Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) restrict contracts to rule out default. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) allow
default, but make it inconsequential to diversiﬁed lenders: the spread paid by successful ﬁrms compensates for any
loan losses from defaulting ﬁrms (and aggregate risk is oﬀset by state-contingent loan rates). The ﬁnancial accelerator
models are about macroeconomic, not ﬁnancial, stability.
32We assume that non-performing loans must be recognized as soon as they become certain, which is at date t.
The write-oﬀ replaces the banking system’s assets RqH by the actual repayment (pty + qtH), the performing portion
of loans.
16Assumption 6 (Equity). The banking system issues no new equity.33 The assumption
requires non-negative dividends, Divt ≥ 0. In keeping with the policy of paying out proﬁts every
period, small loan losses are oﬀset by a reduced dividend (R − 1)K − λ, leaving bank capital K
intact. But large loan losses, λ > (R − 1)K, reduce bank capital to RK − λ < K. Normal
proﬁts serve as a buﬀer: capital falls only to the extent that loan losses exceed normal proﬁts,
K − Kt = λ − (R − 1)K. Since the banking system earns a return R on capital, future dividends
fall to the extent capital does. To summarize,
Bank Capital and Dividends
Kt = Divt = Divt+1 = case
K (R − 1)K − λ (R − 1)K if λ ≤ (R − 1)K
RK − λ 0 (R − 1)[RK − λ] if λ ≥ (R − 1)K
(27)
3.2 Fundamental Equilibrium
We now aggregate agents’ reactions to determine the new equilibrium prices for goods and assets
{pt+i(τ),qt+i(τ)}
∞
i=0. Equilibrium is deﬁned as on page 12.
Asset market equilibrium was given in (20).
Goods market clearing equates aggregate demand with supply, as in (14). The possibility of default
makes aggregate demand inherit the case structure from (25) and (27),
pty =
(
st + [pty + qtH − RqH + λ] + (R − 1)K − λ if λ ≤ (R − 1)K
st if λ ≥ (R − 1)K
(28)
The ﬁrst equation applies when loan losses remain small. Clearly visible is the wealth eﬀect that
weighs on aggregate demand: when qt and pt fall below their steady state values, lower asset market
wealth and sales revenue lead to less spending. The expression is the same whether or not ﬁrms
default (λ drops out); this is so because once ﬁrms’ proﬁts are zero, further losses continue aﬀecting
aggregate demand through reduced bank dividends, until they too are zero.34 Once that happens,
the second line applies: only household spending remains. Note that, by deﬁnition of λ, the two
expressions for aggregate demand merge at λ = (R − 1)K; there are no discontinuities.
Goods market clearing in t + 1 equates the value of (reduced) output with the sum of household
spending, new ﬁrms’ proﬁts (20), and bank dividends (27),
(1 − τ)pt+1y =
(
st+1 + (1 − α)(1 − τ)pt+1y + (R − 1)K if λ ≤ (R − 1)K
st+1 + (1 − α)(1 − τ)pt+1y + (R − 1)[RK − λ] if λ ≥ (R − 1)K
(29)
33In other words, households wish to hold deposits, not bank equity. Evidence suggests that banks ﬁnd it diﬃcult
to raise equity when sustaining losses. The assumption is less objectionable here than in the context of Rochet (1992)
and van den Heuvel (2002). Gorton and Winton (1995, 2000) show that the costs of raising additional capital tends
to be highest when the return on bank assets is low or volatile, and when private bank charter values are impaired.
An alternative explanation, based on signalling, is suggested by Bolton and Freixas (2001).
34Recall the discussion following (26).
17The only diﬀerence with (14) is reduced productivity (τ > 0), and, possibly, reduced bank dividends
if loan losses impaired bank capital.35 Subsequent goods markets are of the same form.
The goods market conditions relate price levels {pt,pt+1,...} to household spending {st,st+1,...}.
The Euler equations (11) do likewise, because household spending responds to price incentives.
Combining Euler equations and market clearing conditions completes goods market equilibrium.







∀i ≥ 0. (30)
This expression usefully compares price levels to p = 1, depending on st+i, the equilibrium spending
required by (28) and (29). With γ < 1 (high intertemporal elasticity of substitution), households
spend more when goods are cheap. We focus on this case, for which the model admits a well-deﬁned
ﬁxed-price limit as γ → 0.36
Proposition 3 establishes that asset prices and the price level fall when fundamentals deteriorate.
Falling prices in the presence of ﬁxed nominal debt lead to deteriorating balance sheets, with the
consequences elaborated in proposition 4.
Proposition 3 Falling Prices
(a) The new steady state is reached in t + 1, the period after the shock.
(b) Over the range λ ≤ (R − 1)K, increasing τ produces:
• permanent asset price decline,
• temporary deﬂation.
(c) Over the range λ ≥ (R − 1)K, increasing τ produces:
• continued asset price decline,
• no further deﬂation.
Proof: Appendix 2. •
The model is easy to work with for a dynamic general equilibrium model, because part (a) shows
that we can restrict attention to periods t and t + 1. The reason for the short-lived dynamics is
the overlapping-generations structure. Old ﬁrms exit, whether or not they default: persistence is
conﬁned to bank capital. Once they have exited, all agents again correctly anticipate future prices
when they ﬁrst incur debt, and the economy reverts to a perfect foresight equilibrium for which a
unique steady state was shown to exist.
The proposition shows that the fundamental equilibrium progressively moves away from the steady
state as the shock increases, δ0(τ) > 0 and p0
t(τ) ≤ 0. The asset price falls because productivity does,
35The case λ > RK need not be addressed separately here: (29) retains the same form (as long as the banking
system intermediates), because the losses borne by depositors, λ − RK, would aﬀect aggregate demand through
reduced st+i in the same way as Divt+i < 0 would.
36The main eﬀect of γ > 1 would be to reverse the pattern of price level movements in proposition 3. Subsequent
results remain largely unchanged, because the asset price always falls, irrespective of γ.
18as suggested by (22). Deﬂation then results from the wealth eﬀect of δ > 0 on proﬁts (25), because
proﬁts are a component of aggregate demand. This becomes clear when the goods market (28) is
simpliﬁed (see appendix 2) to








Equilibrium requires households’ extra spending (st − s) to oﬀset the wealth eﬀect δ(τ)qH. The
price level falls to attract such extra spending (γ < 1). Since deﬂation lowers sales revenue and
ﬁrms’ spending in (28), the fall in aggregate demand is consistent with pt(τ) < 1.















Deﬂation in our model is temporary, and its extent is limited. It is temporary because households’
budget constraint implies that the price level pt+1 (τ) reverts to slightly above 1.37 Deﬂation is
limited because the wealth eﬀect only aﬀects proﬁts and bank dividends; it ceases to operate when




st = pty = s(R/α)1−γ (32)
pt+1 =









When fundamentals deteriorate further, neither aggregate demand nor the price level continue to
fall, but the asset price does: from (22), δ(τ) = 1 − (1 − τ)pt+1. Falling goods and asset prices in
the presence of ﬁxed nominal debt lead to deteriorating balance sheets.
37See appendix 2(b). Since st exceeds permanent income s, st+1 must fall below s to ensure that households do
not overspend permanently. The price level movements implement this pattern of equilibrium spending.
19Proposition 4 Deteriorating Balance Sheets
(a) Total losses ω (τ) and loan losses λ(τ) are monotonically increasing in τ.
(b) The space of fundamentals [0,1] can be divided into four ranges,
according to how losses are borne (see ﬁgure 4).
(c) Falling credit demand is matched by
• (i) monetary contraction if τ ≤ τDiv (ﬁgure 5),
• (ii) monetary contraction and falling bank capital if τ > τDiv.
Proof: It suﬃces to show that losses are monotonically increasing, and that the worst possible
fundamentals imply losses exceeding the ﬁrms’ and banking system’s combined ability to with-
stand them. The nature of standard debt then implies that losses are borne hierarchically. Recall
from (26) that total losses are ω (τ) = δ (τ)qH + [1 − pt (τ)]y, of which the banking system bears
λ(τ) = max{0,ω(τ) − Π}. Clearly, ω0(τ) > 0 since proposition 3 established that δ0(τ) > 0 and
p0(τ) ≤ 0 for all τ ∈ [0,1]. At the extremes we have ω(0) = 0, and ω(1) > RK+Π (see appendix 3).
By continuity, there exist thresholds, ordered 0 < τ0 < τDiv < τK < 1, such that
τ0 : ω (τ0) − Π = 0 λ turns positive
τDiv : λ(τDiv) = (R − 1)K λ eliminates bank dividends
τK : λ(τK) = RK λ eliminates bank capital.
The thresholds τi are shown in appendix 3. The remaining results follow. •
Proposition 4 shows how losses cascade down the debt structure.38 As fundamentals deteriorate,
losses ﬁrst aﬀect ﬁrms, then also the banking system, then also depositors as shown in ﬁgure 4.
Figure 4: Deteriorating Balance Sheets
-
τ
Firms’ Π Πt = 0 -
Bank Div (R − 1)K Divt = 0 -




wealth eﬀects only 6
τ0
λ = 0
default, loan losses 6
τDiv
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Four ranges can be distinguished:
(1) Over the ﬁrst range, the wealth eﬀect on aggregate demand is too small to cause any default.39
Losses are borne by ﬁrms, and proﬁts fall from Π to Πt (horizontal arrow).
38The metaphor evokes Minsky’s work, in which debt structure plays a central role. See Minsky (1982) on debt
deﬂation, and Minsky (1970, 1977, 1978) on the ﬁnancial instability hypothesis.
39Other macroeconomic models only examine this range.
20(2) Once proﬁts reach zero, ﬁrms default and pass on any further losses to the banking system in
the form of non-performing loans, λ > 0. Over this second range, the banking system absorbs loan
losses by reducing its dividend payout, leaving bank capital intact.
(3) When τ > τDiv, loan losses exceed normal bank proﬁts, λ > (R − 1)K, and the diﬀerence is
written oﬀ bank capital.
(4) Finally, fundamentals might deteriorate to the point of eliminating bank capital, Kt ≤ 0. Over
this last range, the banking system is insolvent, and losses are ultimately borne by depositors.
Note that the mapping from fundamentals to losses and outcomes is unique. We can therefore
express the thresholds delimiting these ranges in terms of τ, δ, or λ, although it is the latter, the
size of loan losses, that decides in which range the economy settles. Proposition 4 provides an
answer to question (1) posed in the introduction, how losses aﬀect the banking system. The result
is pure, in the sense that our elastic credit speciﬁcation allowed us to examine this direction of
causality without any of the feedback that would arise if credit were not perfectly elastic.40 Credit
demand is always accommodated at R. Elastic credit then implies that the size of the banking
system endogenously shrinks as fundamentals deteriorate: credit demand falls, because new ﬁrms
borrow less money for purchasing less-valued assets, and credit supply matches this decline.
If bank assets contract, so must liabilities, and it is insightful to go through the mechanics (propo-
sition 4(c)). Figure 5 shows the balance sheet identity At = Dt + Kt as a vertical sum, plotted
against the size of the shock τ. The fall in bank assets is ﬁrst matched by falling deposits, and then
by falling bank capital.

















λ = 0 λ = (R − 1)K λ = RK
40The new phenomena in section 4 can then be attributed to the eﬀect of the banking system on the economy
(question (2), introduction).
21(i) Monetary contraction. For τ ∈ [0,τDiv], loan losses are small, hence bank capital remains
constant. Therefore deposits fall to match the decline in credit. This is consistent with the increased
spending by households st > s found in (31)
Dt = RD − st = D − δqH.
The extra spending received by ﬁrms is applied toward repaying debt; both loans and deposits
are thereby ‘extinguished’ (appendix C shows the balance sheet entries). Since deposits are the
means of payment in this model, a monetary contraction is taking place. The model is consistent
with the ‘credit counterparts’ determination of the money supply: inside money expands by loan
extension, and contracts by loan repayment.41 Note that the spending st that clears the goods
market also reduces deposits in just the right measure; this link demonstrates the consistency of
market equilibrium with the bank balance sheet identity. When household spending has reached
st, deposits remain at Dt = RD − st. We can then ﬁnd the asset price decline δDiv that generates









(ii) Falling bank capital. With bank proﬁts eliminated, it is bank capital that absorbs any
further loan losses resulting from τ > τDiv. Since the price level stops its decline at pt(τDiv) = pt,
loan losses beyond (R − 1)K are entirely due to asset price declines beyond δDiv,
λ(τ) − (R − 1)K = [δ (τ) − δDiv]qH. (33)
The left hand side is the decline in bank capital K − Kt from (27), hence
Kt = K − [δ (τ) − δDiv]qH.
This close relation between bank capital and asset prices is remarkable: the banking system holds
no marketable assets – its exposure to market prices is entirely indirect, through its borrowers’
credit risk. The banking system turns insolvent (Kt = 0) when the asset price decline reaches





At that point, assets just equal the remaining deposits, At (τK) = Dt. Even larger fundamental
shocks than τK are conceivable, whereupon depositors start taking losses, λ−RK. At the extreme
τ → 1, assets lose their productive use. Their price collapses to zero (δ(1) = 1), so does credit
demand (At = 0), and deposits are engulfed by the negative net worth of the banking system
41This principle informs the analysis of monetary aggregates. From this perspective one might question Friedman’s
claim that people cannot in aggregate succeed in reducing nominal balances, because “One man’s expenditures are
another’s receipts.” (Friedman 1970, p. 195).
42Use (32) and (18) to solve the balance sheet identity A − δqH = Dt + K. The solution δDiv can then be used
in (22) to back out the corresponding shock τDiv, see appendix 3(b).
22(Kt = − Dt). The banking system seizes the real assets H from defaulting ﬁrms, and households
repossess H in stead of their deposits. The closing of the banking system precipitates severe real
eﬀects. It destroys the mechanism that had enabled ﬁrms and households to produce and allocate
resources eﬃciently, and the economy degenerates to autarky (see page 7).43
We have now covered the fundamental equilibrium for all possible shocks τ ∈ [0,1], spanning the
entire space between steady state and systemic banking crises.
4 Financial Extremes
The last section described how the state of the economy aﬀects the banking system. The elastic
provision of credit ensured that there was no feedback whereby the banking system would in turn
aﬀect the economy. Lending behavior did not change as bank capital fell: credit demand was always
accommodated at R. Yet when bank capital fell at the speed of credit, the capital-asset ratio must
have been falling rapidly (see ﬁgure 5). Banks, in reality, are not indiﬀerent to their capital-
asset ratio, be it for reasons of regulation or risk management. We account for this possibility
by introducing a capital constraint. This allows us to address question (2) in the introduction
separately, how the state of the banking system in turn aﬀects the economy. The new results in
this section can be attributed to this feedback.
4.1 Capital-Constrained Equilibrium
Assumption 7 (Capital Constraint). The banking system maintains a minimum capital-
asset ratio of (R − 1)/R.44 This is the same ratio the banking system had maintained in the
perfect foresight equilibrium (page 13). The capital constraint states that bank lending (credit
supply) must not exceed a multiple of bank capital, At ≤ R
R−1Kt ≡ A(δ). Two new considerations
arise: (1) credit supply may now be capital-constrained, and if so, (2) the loan rate adjusts to
equate credit demand with capital-constrained credit supply (assumption 3 is lifted).
(1) Credit supply. Credit supply can be related to loan losses and their macroeconomic deter-








A if λ ≤ (R − 1)K
A − R
R−1 [λ(δ) − (R − 1)K] if (R − 1)K ≤ λ ≤ RK
0 if λ ≥ RK.
(34)
A(δ) inherits the case structure from Kt, along with the restriction that bank assets cannot be
43Until the banking system collapses, the real eﬀects in our model are merely distributional: when ﬁrms default,
their owners consume nothing. Output eﬀects would set in earlier if we had incorporated credit-constrained producers,
as do Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
44The 1988 Basel Accord in our context requires the ratio 0.08 on all assets (corporate loans are subject to the
100% risk weight). A capital constraint may also arise in the absence of regulation, see section 5.4.
23negative. Figure 6 plots A(δ) as a function of the asset price decline δ,
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The capital constraint (thick line) never binds as long as capital remains intact at K, because
admissible lending A exceeds credit demand At = qtH = A − δqH. Once loan losses reduce bank
capital, A(δ) declines very steeply, as the second segment of (34) shows. Constancy of the capital-
asset ratio requires each loan loss to be met with a R/(R − 1)-fold contraction of credit, where
the multiple is the leverage of the banking system (18). Once loan losses eliminate capital, the
constraint stipulates zero bank assets.
(2) Credit demand. As before, credit demand is driven by the market’s asset valuation as before,








A capital-constrained equilibrium is a set of endogenous variables {pt,qt,Rt} that satisﬁes
the capital constraint (34), and the equilibrium conditions of the goods market (28) and of the
asset market (35), hence the credit market. The main feature of a capital-constrained equilibrium
is that the asset price qt (and δ) is now determined by the capital constraint (34). With asset
prices determined by bank capitalization, (35) determines the loan rate Rt instead. This can be
understood in two equivalent ways. Viewing (35) as credit demand, the loan rate rises to Rt > R
to bring credit demand down to capital-constrained credit supply A(δ).45 Viewing (35) as an asset
45The borrowing rate Rt > R chokes oﬀ excess credit demand. Firms spend a certain amount on the total cost of
borrowing in (20); raising the price of credit eﬀectively reduces the size of the loans they can aﬀord.
24pricing equation, the loan rate Rt discounts the market’s forward-looking asset valuation down to
the credit-constrained asset price. We call this credit-constrained asset pricing.
To understand the remaining results the following scheme is useful to keep in mind. The capital
constraint depends on the size of loan losses (given bank leverage). Loan losses, in turn, are
driven by two factors: (1) the asset price decline, which can be fundamental or self-fulﬁlling, and
(2) the structural parameters, which determine the size of loan losses generated by any given
decline. Correspondingly, the remaining results concern fundamental and self-fulﬁlling outcomes
(propositions 5-6), and comparative statics on structural parameters (propositions 7-8).
4.2 Capital Crunches and Banking Crises
We ﬁrst show that suﬃciently poor fundamentals (τ > τ∗) necessarily result in a systemic banking
crisis, whereas good fundamentals (τ < τ∗) admit multiple equilibria: self-fulﬁlling capital crunches
and banking crises coexist with the fundamental equilibrium of propositions 3 and 4.
Proposition 5 Capital Crunches and Banking Crises
(a) The size of loan losses λ determines whether a capital crunch, ﬁnancial instability,
or a banking crisis occurs.
(b) For τ ≤ τ∗ the fundamental equilibrium is unconstrained (as before),
for τ = τ∗, the fundamental equilibrium is a capital crunch,
for τ > τ∗, the fundamental equilibrium is a banking crisis.
(c) For τ ≤ τ∗, self-fulﬁlling capital crunches and banking crises may occur, with
• a jump decline in goods and asset prices,
• an interest rate spread Rt(τ) − R, due to credit-constrained asset pricing.
Proof: The capital crunch and the banking crisis are ﬁxed points of (34), where the asset price
decline (hence credit demand) coincides with the contraction required by the capital constraint
(hence credit supply). This can only happen when losses exceed bank proﬁts, λ > (R − 1)K.




, we ﬁnd {qt,Rt} consistent with (34) and (35). Expressing qtH = A(δ) in deviations






λ(δ) − (R − 1)K

if (R − 1)K ≤ λ ≤ RK
qH if λ ≥ RK.
(36)
46When Rt > R, the banking system earns a spread on all lending. As proﬁts are paid out as dividends, Divt+1
increases by (Rt − R)qtH. This leaves the goods market unaﬀected, because new ﬁrms’ spending is reduced by the
same amount: the spread is a transfer.
25The size of λ determines whether a banking crisis (line 2) or a capital crunch (line 1) occurs.47 The
respective asset price declines are δ = 1, and






These declines are fundamental if τ = 1 and τ = τ∗, respectively. The latter is found by solving
δ∗ = 1 − (1 − τ∗)pt+1, see appendix 3(b). The banking system’s dividend policy implies that the
same capital constraint holds in subsequent periods. Hence, the asset price remains constant after
t, and credit demand (35) becomes qtH = α(1 − τ)pt+1y/(Rt − 1). When expressed in deviations,
and upon replacing pt+1, we can express the loan rate as
Rt − 1
R − 1






In a fundamental equilibrium, we let particular fundamentals {τ∗,1} bring about the declines
{δ∗,1} (while Rt = R). In a self-fulﬁlling equilibrium, we let a particular loan rate Rt(τ) bring
about {δ∗,1} (while τ < τ∗). Accordingly, the following equilibria are possible,
Characterization Capital Crunch Banking Crisis Both
if fundamental 1 − τ∗ = (1 − δ∗)




1−τ∗ Rt → ∞ τ ≤ τ∗
in both cases δ = δ∗ δ = 1 pt,st
(38)
The capital constraint (34) binds only for δ ≥ δ∗ (see ﬁgure 6). Therefore, any τ < τ∗ also admits
the fundamental equilibrium with δ (τ) < δ∗, found in proposition 3. Any τ > τ∗ implies δ(τ) > δ∗,
which can satisfy (34) only if δ = 1. •
We interpret these results as follows. As in the fundamental equilibrium (page 21), the size of
loan losses determines the outcome. But loan losses may occur due to poor fundamentals or due
to self-fulﬁlling asset price declines: the mapping from fundamentals to loan losses is no longer
unique, because the system can always jump to a binding capital constraint (which closes the loop
in the diagram on page 2). Accordingly, the space of fundamentals is split around the threshold τ∗
that makes the capital constraint just bind.
Good fundamentals (τ < τ∗). The capital constraint does not bind, provided assets are valued
according to fundamentals, δ(τ) < δ∗; if so, the fundamental equilibrium materializes. But in
spite of good fundamentals, self-fulﬁlling credit crunches and banking crises may occur: the capital
constraint binds whenever δ ≥ δ∗, whether or not this decline is due to fundamentals. The capital
crunch (δ = δ∗), and the banking crisis (δ = 1), are the two self-fulﬁlling equilibria where the
asset price decline generates exactly the measure of loan losses λ(δ) that forces bank lending to
contract by δ percent.48 This may happen even when τ = 0. Intuitively, if the market expects
47Proposition 6 shows that ﬁnancial instability occurs between these two equilibria.




/D = (K − Kt)/K = δ
∗ or 1.
26that credit is not forthcoming, the asset price falls until loan losses indeed interrupt credit supply.
Likewise, if the expectation prevails that loan losses are imminent, then the banking system reduces
lending, enforced by Rt(τ) > R, and the resulting asset price decline and defaults cause exactly
the anticipated loan losses. Capital crunches and banking crises can be understood as equilibrium
phenomena, as the two ﬁxed points where credit contraction and asset price decline are mutually
consistent.49 The spread in (38) provides a measure of the degree to which a capital crunch
equilibrium is self-fulﬁlling. This is why the spread is decreasing in τ: better fundamentals are
associated with a larger spread on safe loans, because credit demand must be reduced more to
match capital-constrained credit supply.50
Poor fundamentals (τ > τ∗). The only possible equilibrium in that range is a banking crisis,
because δ (τ) necessarily exceeds the threshold δ∗. Therefore, the capital constraint necessarily
binds, and it propels the system toward a banking crisis. We interpret this process as ﬁnancial
instability.
4.3 Financial Instability
The model is unstable in the space between the capital crunch and the banking crisis. The disequi-
librium adjustment yields a natural characterization of ﬁnancial instability as an unstable credit
contraction, accompanied by falling asset prices and mounting loan losses.
Proposition 6 Financial Instability
(a) the capital crunch equilibrium is unstable, the banking crisis equilibrium is stable.
(b) for δ > δ∗ ﬁnancial instability occurs.
Proof: follows directly from proposition 5 and (36). •
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49In a multi-bank extension, this corresponds to multiple symmetric Nash-equilibria in an interest-setting game
(Bertrand competition). The capital constraint causes complementarity: other banks’ reduced lending causes low
asset prices and losses, so that the remaining bank’s lending is thereby constrained. (Rajan (1994) studies another
form of lending complementarity, based on reputation. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the complementarity is due
to the sequential service constraint.) Note that asymmetric equilibria can be ruled out because household spending
– hence the deposits of each bank – respond identically to the economy-wide price level pt. This is useful, because
asymmetric equilibria would force us to apply bank reserves (footnote 26) to the clearing and settlement of asymmetric
interbank balances.
50Think of 1 − τ as the strength of the economy (hence credit demand), and 1 − τ
∗ as the state of the banking
system (with capital-constrained credit supply). The ratio (1 − τ)/(1 − τ
∗) then measures the relative inadequacy
of credit supply; the spread is smallest when τ → τ
∗, because credit demand is as depressed as credit supply, and it
is greatest when a self-fulﬁlling capital crunch occurs despite strong fundamentals τ → 0.
27Figure 7 visualizes this equation. The asset price decline δ appears on the right (RHS), because the
asset price decline contributes to loan losses λ. It also appears on the left (LHS), because reducing
lending (which increases δ) is the way to comply with the capital constraint. The capital crunch
equilibrium δ∗ is found at their intersection.
Due to high bank leverage, the RHS is much steeper in δ than the LHS: the capital crunch equi-
librium is unstable under perturbation. Consider a slight deterioration of loan losses. Given δ∗,
compliance with a tighter capital constraint requires bank lending to contract (arrow up). Reduced
credit worsens the asset price decline (arrow right). But δ > δ∗ generates new loan losses, which
requires further credit contraction (arrow up). This sets oﬀ a new round of loan losses (arrow right)
with further contractionary eﬀects. Loan losses accrue at a faster rate than the contraction of bank
credit can keep up with (the trajectory diverges). Financial instability therefore occurs whenever
δ(τ) > δ∗, which is unavoidable if τ > τ∗.














































Under the continued compliance with the capital constraint, ﬁnancial instability comes to a halt
only when credit and asset prices have collapsed: once capital becomes negative, the system jumps
to

At = 0,δ = 1,Kt = −Dt
	
. We have encountered this outcome before (page 22), but only for
the worst possible fundamentals (τ = 1). The capital constraint brings this outcome forward, as
any shock τ ∈ (τ∗,1) now triggers ﬁnancial instability ending in a banking crisis. The outcome is
a ﬁnancial crisis in the sense that it is precipitated by a ﬁnancial constraint, rather than by poor
fundamentals. But the real eﬀects are as severe. In sum, the capital crunch equilibrium repels, the
banking crisis equilibrium attracts, and ﬁnancial instability is the process of adjustment between
the two.
284.4 Vulnerability
The eﬀect of asset prices on the banking system is highly non-linear: as long as borrowers repay,
there is no eﬀect. Once they default, a stable relation emerges whereby asset prices aﬀect bank
capital through the value of collateral (page 22). Once the capital constraint binds, that relation
becomes unstable, and capital, credit and asset prices implode. Each transition is marked by
threshold values τi and δi that depend on structural features of the economy, {α,β,γ}.51
This leads to a natural deﬁnition of vulnerability as the sensitivity of the economy to falling asset
prices. The smaller the thresholds δi(α,β,γ), the more vulnerable the economy to any given
decline δ. The model is well-suited to explore these comparative statics, because {α,β,γ} and
{τ,δ} can be varied independently of each other. It is useful to take a structural approach to
devising thresholds as they are commonly used in stress testing exercises that assess risks to ﬁnancial
stability.
Proposition 7 Vulnerability
An economy is more vulnerable to asset price declines with
• greater leverage (α)
• higher rate of time preference (β)
• greater deﬂationary tendency (γ).
Proof: Appendix 3(c) shows that the greater α,β, and γ, the smaller the thresholds τi. •
The intuition is straightforward: greater values of {α,β,γ} translate any given asset price decline
into greater loan losses, the size of which drives our previous results. In particular, higher leverage
(α) and a lower interest rate (higher β) both increase asset valuation qH in (16). Similarly, higher
γ leads to greater deﬂation, given the size of the wealth eﬀect δqH, see (31) and (32). Taken
together, these eﬀects increase the size of losses (26) for any given δ, while the ability to withstand
them, Π, falls. Therefore, loan losses λ(α,β,γ|δ,τ) increase and precipitate more adverse outcomes.
Equivalently, the same outcomes are now reached at smaller thresholds δi and τi.
One interpretation of this result is that more developed ﬁnancial systems are more prone to ﬁnancial
instability: they feature greater leverage and lower interest rates.52 Firm leverage is essential for
ﬁnancial instability because leverage constitutes exposure to asset price declines.53 Bank leverage is
51Recall that α measures ﬁrm leverage, since higher output elasticity encourages ﬁrms to purchase more assets and
incur more debt qH (see page 13). Parameter β represents the rate of time preference, the inverse of the nominal
interest rate R. Finally, γ measures the ‘deﬂationary tendency’ of the economy: a lower intertemporal elasticity of
substitution 1/γ makes households less willing to increase their spending st to plug the hole in aggregate demand
and attenuate deﬂation. (At the limit γ → 0, spending is so responsive that the price level remains ﬁxed, pt(τ) = 1.
The slightest deviation would evoke inﬁnite (or zero) spending by households, which conﬂicts with market clearing).
52Borio and Lowe (2002) argue that an environment of low inﬂation and high growth may encourage the build-up
of ﬁnancial imbalances. Their emphasis on the ’unwinding of ﬁnancial imbalances’ following asset prices declines
(p. 19) is similar to the mechanism of our model. Indicative of this possibility is the frequency of ﬁnancial instability
in the aftermath of liberalizations (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999).
53With no leverage, α = 0, default is impossible. With unit leverage, α = (R−1)/R in (17), ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts
29also essential, because a lower capital-asset ratio provides a smaller buﬀer for absorbing losses. By
contrast, a positive deﬂationary tendency γ is not essential for ﬁnancial instability. It exacerbates
vulnerability (γ → 1 ⇒ δ∗ → 0), but its absence does not guarantee ﬁnancial stability.
Proposition 8 Macroeconomic versus Financial Stability
(a) Macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability are distinct, but not independent.
(b) A policy preventing deﬂation does not necessarily deliver ﬁnancial stability.
The model distinguishes between the two concepts as deﬁned on page 1. Macroeconomic stability
depends on the parameters governing deﬂation and output, γ and τ. Financial stability, by contrast,
depends on the size of loan losses and asset price declines, λ and δ. To relate the two concepts,
we arrange previous results in four cases. While macroeconomic and ﬁnancial instability (MiS and
FiS) tend to occur together, either may occur alone:
MiS⇒FiS. In a fundamental equilibrium, causation runs from the economy to the banking system.
Asset prices fall only if future output and price levels do. Only a suﬃciently large macroeconomic
shock brings about ﬁnancial instability (τ > τ∗).
FiS⇒MiS. In a self-fulﬁlling equilibrium, the causation is reversed: deﬂation (and output collapse)
can occur as a by-product of self-fulﬁlling capital crunches (and banking crises).
MiS alone. A large productivity shock τ may depress output without causing any loan losses, if
leverage (α) and deﬂationary tendency (γ) are suﬃciently low.
FiS alone. A self-fulﬁlling banking crisis may occur without producing any deﬂation, and a self-
fulﬁlling capital crunch may produce neither deﬂation nor an output gap, if γ → 0 and τ → 0
respectively.
One is led to the conclusion that a policy preventing deﬂation does not necessarily deliver ﬁnan-
cial stability.54 Such a policy may be conducive to ﬁnancial stability, as claimed by Bordo and
Wheelock (1998), and Bernanke and Gertler (1999), but it is not suﬃcient to guarantee it.
5 Applications
5.1 Case Study I: Japan’s Lost Decade
Japan’s Lost Decade (1990s) is marked by the bursting of an asset price bubble, and a decade of
banking distress with sluggish growth.55 Models ignoring asset prices and non-performing loans
match their debt (RqH = Π); absent deﬂation, not even δ = 1 causes default.
54This policy amounts to reducing R suﬃciently in the original Euler equation (page 8), to implement equilibrium
spending {st,st+1} with no need for price level movements. The lower bound R ≥ 1 means that this policy can
remove deﬂation for γ suﬃciently small.
55See Cargill et al (1997) for the background, especially chapters 5-6.
30cannot reasonably explain this experience. Our characterization of capital crunches (section 4.2),
however, captures several essential aspects of this episode.
First, the decline in asset prices has been spectacular (large δ). Stock prices fell 70% since 1989,
and urban commercial land prices fell 85% since 1992 (Ueda, 2003, p. 3). Second, the sharp decline
in asset prices caused a large measure of loan losses to Japanese banks (large λ). The often cited
‘non-performing loans problem’ almost completely characterizes the state of the Japanese ﬁnancial
system. Estimates of aggregate non-performing loans for the late 1990s settle around 7-8% of GDP
(Hoshi and Kashyap, 1999). Loan losses exceeded operating proﬁts every year since 1994.56 In the
model this corresponds to λ > (R−1)K where proposition 3(c) applies. Importantly, the evidence
that real estate-related industries caused the heaviest loan losses (Hoshi, 2001) is consistent with
our direction of causality from falling asset prices to the default of leveraged ﬁrms.57 Propositions
3 and 4 are therefore relevant to the Japanese case,
”It has been the deﬂation of asset prices, not that of general prices, that has generated serious
negative eﬀects on the balance sheets of borrowers and, over time, on those of lenders.” p. 2
The deterioration of balance sheets can be mostly explained by declines in asset prices and by non-
performing loans (in the case of banks). Moreover, most of the declines in bank lending since the
mid-1990s can be attributed to these two factors, together with the liquidity problems of banks
during 1997-98. Ueda (2003) p. 4
Third, the non-performing loan problem induced a capital crunch. The liquidation of Jusen
companies during early 1996 had already imposed losses on the founder institutions (mostly large
banks); the phasing in of prompt corrective action accelerated write-oﬀs, and focused supervisory
attention on capital ratios.58 Since 1990, issuing new equity had been virtually impossible: given
low proﬁtability and limited access to capital markets, banks responded by trying to squeeze their
asset size (Nakaso 2001) – as the model suggests. Total bank lending growth fell throughout the
decade to become negative in the late 1990s.59 The clearest evidence of a capital crunch points
to private banks during ﬁscal year 1997, see Woo (1999), and Watanabe (2002).60 This timing is
consistent with the hypothesis that non-performing loans were responsible for the capital crunch.
Capital crunches can be fundamental or self-fulﬁlling (proposition 5). If fundamentals are weak, so
is credit demand, and the spread is small, τ → τ∗ in (38). Hoggarth and Thomas (1999) note that
spreads indeed remained small. Our model then appears to imply that Japan’s banking distress is
56See Figure 9 in Nakaso (2001). The loan losses reported by banks during 1992-99, amount to 13.2 times the
average annual operating proﬁt; it would have taken 13 years for Japanese banks to dispose of loan losses relying
on proﬁts alone (p. 30). Between April 1992 and March 2000, 17% of GDP has been spent on dealing with the
non-performing loans problem (p. 2); the ﬁgure is now approaching 20% (Ueda, 2003, p. 4).
57Hoshi (2001) shows that the cross-sectional variation of non-performing loans ratios of Japanese banks is best
explained by the variation in the growth of loans to the real estate industry. The proportion of lending to this industry
amounts to 12% (ﬁgure 6); that to real-estate related industries amounts to 25% (Okina et al, 2001, ﬁgure 16).
58PCA allows regulators to intervene in banks that do not comply with risk-based capital adequacy regulation
(Basel Accord) in force since 1993.
59See Nakaso (2001), ﬁgure 12, Watanabe (2002), ﬁgure 4.
60Foreign lending by large City Banks saw the steepest decline, a fact exploited by Peek and Rosengren (2000) to
identify an independent loan supply shock in US real estate markets.
31fundamental, rather than self-fulﬁlling. In a controversial paper, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) put
forth the view that falling productivity largely explains Japan’s lost decade. Their hypothesis ﬁts
squarely with our model, because it would take a permanent fall in productivity of about 70% in
(22) to produce the observed asset price decline, since deﬂation remained moderate. That would
imply a severe recession in (19), contradicted by Japan’s actual output realization. This large a
productivity decline is implausible unless the bubble of the late 1980s was predicated on a vast
overestimation of future productivity.
Proposition 6 (a) predicts that a capital crunch is an unstable equilibrium. Anecdotal evidence
indeed suggests that the Japanese ﬁnancial system witnessed signs of instability precisely in late
1997 during the capital crunch. As described in Nakaso (2001), the non-performing loans problem
threatened the viability of several major banks (p. 7). When ﬁnancial institutions started default-
ing, a short period of ﬁnancial instability ensued, which was contained by the Bank of Japan’s
intervention (p. 9).
In sum, the banking system did not collapse, but it suﬀered a capital crunch due to loan losses
following substantial asset price declines, as illustrated on page 2. It is then not surprising that
expansionary ﬁscal and monetary have failed to support asset prices and stimulate the economy:
both depend on bank credit, which is constrained by low bank capital. Note that Japan’s banking
problem is about the deterioration of bank assets – no bank runs on any signiﬁcant scale took
place. Our model therefore provides a better ﬁt than those reviewed on page 3. The relevance of
our model faces a tougher test in the Great Depression.
5.2 Case Study II: The US Great Depression
The US Great Depression (1929-1933) witnessed the collapse of the ﬁnancial system and a depres-
sion unprecedented in scale. The experience reveals a gap in our analysis: bank runs. Nonetheless,
the model suggests a coherent story of default and banking distress that is largely new within
macroeconomics.
The famous stock market crash of 1929 initiated a prolonged decline of prices. The stock market
fell by 24% on October 28-29, 1929, and continued to fall until reaching a trough in early 1933,
some 75% below its peak in September 1929 (Mishkin and White, 2003). Similarly, the decline
of bond prices is cited by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) as a major source of losses to banks
(p. 355-56). Most famously, price level deﬂation of 27% in consumer prices (39% in wholesale
prices) contributed to ﬁnancial distress by raising the real burden of debt, as pointed out by
Fisher (1933).61 The deﬂationary tendency was much more pronounced than during Japan’s Lost
Decade (with cumulative deﬂation of 3%, Ueda 2003). Falling prices and economic activity led to
a generalized debt crisis. The evidence cited in Bernanke (1983) suggests high rates of default in
all sectors.62 Default on this scale produced signiﬁcant loan losses to the banking system. As a
61Deﬂation is cumulative between June 1928 and early 1933, see Bernanke and Mihov (2000) p. 112.
62The ratio of debt service to national income went from 9% (1929) to almost 20% (1932-33). Survey evidence
32result, a capital crunch set in,63
”In response to loan losses in the early 1930s, and high costs of raising new capital, banks faced
signiﬁcant pressure from depositors to reduce deposit risk. Banks cut dividends but avoided new
oﬀerings of stock and thus allowed capital to remain low. The primary means to reduce depositor
risk, and thus prevent deposit withdrawals, was the contraction of the supply of loans.”
. Calomiris and Wilson (1998) p. 1-2
This response resembles that predicted by our model (proposition 5). However, the economy
failed to maintain the delicate capital crunch equilibrium. Bank runs tipped the balance toward
ﬁnancial instability. Bank runs were an important channel that our model omits. But the variables
we modelled (deﬂation, asset price declines and loan losses) help explain what triggered the bank
runs. The traditional view considers them depositor panics.64 Yet the poor state of the economy
suggests that the bank runs may have been a symptom, rather than the cause, of the ongoing
deterioration of balance sheets. Even Friedman and Schwartz (1963) recognize the “drastically
weakened capital position of the commercial banks” (p. 330), and concede that the deterioration of
credit quality may have triggered the bank runs (p. 356). Stronger evidence is provided by Calomiris
and Mason (2002) in the most comprehensive study on bank failures to date. They show that
fundamentals, including losses from loans and bond holdings, explain most of the incidence of bank
failures. Their data (bank-level, local, and regional) reveal patterns invisible in the aggregates on
which Friedman and Schwartz based their view. The only aggregate indicator that correlates with
bank failures is ‘liabilities of failed businesses’.65 Interestingly, this variable corresponds to λ in our
model.
Financial instability ended in the collapse of the banking system in March 1933. While this outcome
coincides with proposition 6, the direction of causality does not. Friedman and Schwartz emphasize
the “multiple contraction of deposits, hence of assets” (p. 355). Our model favors the reverse
causation: loan losses bring about the multiple contraction assets, hence of deposits (and capital).66
Even if secondary, this direction of causality is consistent with Bernanke’s (1983) ﬁndings that
‘non-monetary eﬀects’, caused by the impaired intermediation, contributed to the severity of the
Great Depression. In particular, his regressions indicate that two distress variables, liabilities of
failed businesses and deposits of failed banks, together predict bank loans, which in turn help
predict industrial production.67 Also the evidence on credit rationing and the rising cost of credit
indicates that rates of default on mortgages of 38%, farm mortgage delinquency rates of 45%, and wide-spread failures
among small business were not uncommon during the early 1930s, see Bernanke (1983), p. 260-61. His main point is
that the debt crisis impaired the channels of credit intermediation.
63The decline in lending and anecdotal evidence are reported in Bernanke (1983), table 1 and p. 264-67.
64See Friedman and Schwartz (1963), and much of the theoretical literature following Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
65Calomiris and Mason (2002), p. 8. This complements earlier eﬀorts by Gorton (1988) examining the seven
banking panics of the National Banking Era (1863-1914): “Remarkably, the data support the notion of a critical or
threshold value of the liabilities of failed businesses variable, and a threshold value of the perceived risk measure,
at the [banking] panic dates. The seemingly anomalous event of a panic appears to be no more anomalous than
recessions.” (p. 241). See also Calomiris and Hubbard (1989), Calomiris and Gorton (1991).
66See ﬁgure 5 and footnote 41.
67Indicative of the same direction of causality is the ﬁnding that wholesale price deﬂation Granger-caused both M1
and industrial production, see Bernanke and Mihov (2000) p. 122.
33intermediation (proxied by Baa-AAA spread) suggest a problem of intermediation and credit supply.
Overall, the model does not match the Great Depression as well as Japan’s Lost Decade. But it does
have the virtue of incorporating default and banking distress hitherto ignored in macroeconomics
(see page 3). In both cases, the interaction of credit, asset prices and loan losses has played a
central role. This approach, we believe, can be applied more broadly to boom-bust cycles and
other episodes of ﬁnancial distress.68
5.3 Policy Debate I: Monetary Policy and Asset Prices
A widely held view maintains that monetary policy should not react to asset prices beyond their
predictive content for future inﬂation – except perhaps in the event of a large decline.69 Yet the
literature provides little guidance on how to identify such exceptions. Mishkin and White (2003)
clarify the debate, proposing ﬁnancial stability as the relevant criterion,
”[...] ﬁnancial instability is the key problem facing the policymaker and not stock market crashes,
even if they reﬂect the bursting of an asset price bubble. If the balance sheets of ﬁnancial and
nonﬁnancial institutions are initially strong, then a stock market crash (bursting of the bubble) is
unlikely to lead to ﬁnancial instability. [...] However, central banks may see the need to directly
respond to a stock market crash when the crash puts stress on the ﬁnancial system in order to
prevent ﬁnancial instability. [...] A focus on ﬁnancial instability also implies that central banks will
respond to disruptions in the ﬁnancial markets even if the stock market is not a major concern.”
. Mishkin and White (2003) p. 73-74
Their argument can only be evaluated within a macroeconomic model addressing ﬁnancial insta-
bility. Our results support Mishkin and White’s argument, provided that timely monetary policy
is eﬀective. Recall that α represents leverage, hence balance sheet vulnerability (proposition 7).
Figure 8 plots δ∗(α) as derived in (37): the greater leverage, the smaller the asset price decline
that causes a capital crunch. Following proposition 6, this curve can be interpreted as a ﬁnancial
stability frontier.
Now consider two economies that diﬀer only in this measure of balance sheet strength.70 If balance
sheets are initially weak (α = 1/2, say), then an asset price decline above 5.5% triggers ﬁnancial
instability. With stronger balance sheets (α = 1/4), it takes a decline of 16% to do so, three
times the size. Put diﬀerently, a sudden asset price decline of 10% causes ﬁnancial instability and
a banking crisis in one case, yet barely aﬀects bank capital in the other. The radically diﬀerent
68On the role of deﬂation in ﬁnancial crises, Bordo and Wheelock (1998); on the role of asset prices, Kindle-
berger (1996), Hunter et al (2003); on real estate in particular, Herring and Wachter (1999), Mera and Bertrand (2000).
On asset prices and credit in predicting banking crises, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Borio and Lowe (2002).
On loan losses in banking crises, Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), and Caprio et al (1998). On the role of capital
crunches over the business cycle, Wojnilower (1980), Eckstein and Sinai (1986).
69See the four views in Bank of International Settlements (1998), and Bernanke and Gertler (1999).
70The example uses R = 1.05 and γ = 0. A positive deﬂationary tendency (γ > 0) implies greater losses for any δ,
shifting the locus down. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) put forth a similar example (p. 21), but their simulations are
conﬁned to the neighborhood of the steady state (p. 31).
34outcomes suggests that the response of monetary policy should be conditioned on α, the initial
state of balance sheets.















Can monetary policy avert ﬁnancial instability? A complete answer requires two extensions best
left to a separate paper, but some observations can be made. First note that any successful policy
must be timely, carried out in t. Once losses have materialized, the damage cannot be undone by
subsequent monetary easing.71 Three policies can then be distinguished. First, liquidity injections
at R are ineﬀective in our context, because the banking system needs no additional reserves (see
footnote 26).72 Second, an interest rate reduction (Rt < R) helps asset prices only if banks are
unconstrained, see (21). When multiple equilibria are possible, this policy works if it coordinates
the banking system on the better, fundamental equilibrium. Therefore, only a timely interest rate
cut is likely to avert ﬁnancial instability, and only if fundamentals are suﬃciently good (τ < τ∗).73
Finally, one may also consider preemptive tightening to prevent a build-up of ﬁnancial imbalances
in the ﬁrst place (Borio and Lowe 2002). An increase in R, if phased in carefully, would indeed
reduce leverage and vulnerability, shifting up the ﬁnancial stability frontier δ∗(α).
5.4 Policy Debate II: Procyclical Eﬀect of Capital Adequacy Requirements
Empirical evidence suggests that the procyclicality of the ﬁnancial system may cause ﬁnancial
instability (Borio et al 2001, p. 11).74 Bank capital, provisioning, proﬁts and risk assessments all
move over the cycle in a way that encourages procyclical lending, which may feed boom-bust cycles
71A ﬁnancial crisis is not ‘symmetrically reversible’, to borrow the expression of Calomiris (1995) p. 253.
72However, making bank loans eligible for rediscount would allow the banking system to improve capital adequacy
by selling loans to the central bank (bank reserves require no capital). The central bank would eﬀectively take on
part of the intermediation normally left to the banking system.
73This could explain why a small temporary rate cuts in a crucial moment, such as October 1987 or November
1998, can have a decisive eﬀect on ﬁnancial markets.
74Procyclicality refers to the tendency of the ﬁnancial system to reinforce, and sometimes shape, the business cycle,
where it is understood that the forces in question emanate from the ﬁnancial system rather than from the economy.
35in credit and asset prices. Goodhart (1995) singles out the role of capital adequacy requirements
in the context of the late 1980s and early 1990s,
”The asset price cycle was both driven by, and drove, an accompanying cycle in bank credit expan-
sion, and to a somewhat lesser extent in broad money. The collapse of these asset markets after
1990 was associated with a widespread rise in bad debts, in the need for bank provisions and in a
fall in bank proﬁts. In many countries banks either failed, or exhibited considerable distress. Pru-
dential regulations, e.g. the Basle capital adequacy ratios, bit more tightly, and will, to some largely
unquantiﬁable extent, have aggravated the constriction of bank credit.” Goodhart (1995) p. 293
This quote essentially restates the mechanism we have modelled (page 2). Our capital con-
straint (34) is identical to a capital adequacy requirement, and it generates an extreme form of
procyclicality in our model.75 Without the constraint, the banking system was shown to supply
credit elastically without producing the slightest degree of procyclicality, even as loan losses under-
mined bank solvency (section 3). The addition of the constraint in section 4 induced self-fulﬁlling
capital crunches and banking crises, and brought forward ﬁnancial instability, with the associated
collapse in output and asset prices (propositions 5 and 6). The capital constraint was shown to
have a destabilizing eﬀect once losses exceed a threshold.
Would it not be desirable, from a macroeconomic perspective, to remove capital adequacy require-
ments or pursue a policy of forbearance? To draw this conclusion from our analysis would be
misleading. First, the analysis ignored the risk and incentive eﬀects that motivate capital adequacy
regulation (see Rochet 1992 for a model). If taxpayers are to be protected from risk-taking by
undercapitalized banks, then bank assets of under-capitalized banks must shed risk or shrink, with
the attendant procyclical eﬀect. Second, a capital constraint may arise for reasons unrelated to reg-
ulation.76 It is plausible that regulation merely raises the capital ratio that banks would otherwise
adopt. If so, then removing capital adequacy regulation would in fact exacerbate procyclicality:
with lower capital and dividends, the contraction would set in earlier and with greater force, as
measured by the coeﬃcient in (34). A smaller capital ratio chosen by banks may be worse than
a higher ratio chosen by the regulator. Third, the phenomenon of procyclicality is more general
than the particular capital constraint with which we chose to illustrate it. Financial instability
remains possible whenever aggregate bank lending falls faster than loan losses accrue.77 This is a
weak condition, one that may very well be the result of individual banks’ prudent lending policies.
Moreover, such behavior need not be conﬁned to banks.78
75Blum and Hellwig (1995) provide an alternative analysis in a static macroeconomic model. They show that a
binding capital adequacy requirement increases the sensitivity of output and the price level to aggregate demand
disturbances. Their model does not deal with asset prices and ﬁnancial instability.
76Explanations include monitoring incentives (Holmstr¨ om and Tirole 1997), buﬀer against failure (Gorton and
Winton 1995, 2000, Diamond and Rajan 2000), and market discipline (Calomiris and Wilson 1998). Historical
evidence suggests a tendency toward self-regulation. Gorton (1985) shows that private clearinghouses in the US
endogenously arose to coordinate and regulate banks (including capital requirements), long before such activities
were nationalized following the founding of the Federal Reserve System (1913). Indeed, capital ratios used to be
higher: the century-long decline in bank capital ratios is documented in Berger et al (1995), ﬁgure 1.
77This can be shown by combining (33) and (34).
78For instance, Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) model of performance-based arbitrage implies a similar condition,
whereby current investment reacts to previous losses more than one-for-one (see their propositions 3 and 4).
36It is sometimes suggested that loan loss provisions and regulatory capital ratios should increase
during economic booms (Borio et al 2001, p. 49). Here, one would let the capital ratio depend
inversely, and dividends positively, on τ. This would mitigate, but not remove, procyclicality. To
overturn our result on instability, the constraint would have to be weakened to the point of making
it non-binding everywhere. An alternative is to temporarily lift capital requirements following a
large aggregate shock (Goodhart 1995, p. 290). This could implement the fundamental equilibrium,
provided banks do not reduce lending for other reasons.
5.5 Conclusion
We proposed a model to extend the reach of macroeconomics to ﬁnancial instability in a simple
and explicit manner. The mechanism centered on loan losses, their origin (asset price declines and
deﬂation), and their eﬀect on the banking system (falling bank capital and credit). This way of
interacting a deteriorating economy with a deteriorating banking system yields a uniﬁed approach
to a broad spectrum of outcomes, including capital crunches, ﬁnancial instability, and banking
crises. The ability to distinguish between macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability, and the emphasis
on banking and balance sheets, make this approach useful for interpreting episodes, for evaluating
policy debates, and for devising stress testing thresholds for assessing risks to ﬁnancial stability.
For our approach to become more than a ﬁrst step, several extensions should be undertaken. First,
a treatment of risk would be desirable, because the main justiﬁcation for bank capital is its role
as a buﬀer. Our results may change little if an unexpectedly large shock has a similar eﬀect
as the unexpected shock we considered. But the inclusion of risk would allow one to examine
other interesting questions such as whether the New Basel Capital Accord (with more risk-sensitive
weights in the capital constraint) would enhance or reduce procyclicality.
Second, including asymmetric information would be sensible, for its role in shaping ﬁnancial ar-
rangements, and because asymmetric information problems are widely believed to exacerbate ﬁ-
nancial instability. Our speciﬁcation of perfect information and elastic credit ensured that default
occurred only when unavoidable, and that no ineﬃciencies took place. The eﬀect of informational
frictions can be measured by the extent to which they shift down thresholds (increase vulnerabil-
ity). Third, extending the system to several banks would allow a systematic treatment of interbank
payments and liquidity needs. This would provide a foundation for analyzing lending of last resort
and interest rate policy during ﬁnancial distress.
Finally we touch on some empirical implications. One could measure the extent of feedback and
procyclicality due to the banking system by estimating the reduction in bank lending in response
to loan losses in (36): if the coeﬃcient exceeds one, ﬁnancial instability is possible once banks
become capital-constrained. Another testable implication is the spread on safe borrowers predicted
by (38). More generally, we have shown that loan losses can be a decisive macroeconomic quantity.
Using loan losses in econometric models may lead to more accurate estimates in two areas of central
banking: the assessment of risks to ﬁnancial stability, and the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy.
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Invert the Euler equation (11) to obtain pt = (st+1/st)
γ
1−γ pt+1. This is the original form. The
proposed form pt = (st/s)
γ





which requires pt+1 = (st+1/s)
γ
γ−1. This in turn coincides with the original form for pt+1 if pt+2 =
(st+2/s)
γ
γ−1. Going forward, the two forms are equivalent if some future pt+T assumes the proposed
form. The proposed form can then be justiﬁed by a long-run neutrality criterion: the new steady
state price level equals the old only if household spending does, p0 = 1 ⇔ s0 = s.79 This criterion
is satisﬁed by the proposed form, p0 = (s0/s)
γ
γ−1. •
2. Falling Prices, Proposition 3.
We make use of the parameter relations s = (R − 1)D and qH = RD, and the identities qt ≡
q (1 − δ) and A ≡ D + K = qH.
Part (a) The goods market clearing conditions from t + 1 onward are always of the form (29).
Connecting consecutive st+i using the Euler equation (11) implies a constant price level, hence a
new steady state, from t + 1 onward: the proof of proposition 2 applies regardless of the case in
(29).
Part (b) To obtain (31), use the ﬁrst line of (28), cancel pty, and split RqH into qH + (R − 1)qH.
This brings out δqH and (R − 1)(qH − K) = (R − 1)D = s, and yields st = s + δqH. We
solve the model by ﬁnding the solution function pt+1(τ), and recover δ(τ) and pt(τ). To ﬁnd pt+1,
use st+1 in (30). Having a new steady state in t + 1 implies an inverse relation between st and
st+1: with st+i = st+1, households’ intertemporal budget constraint
P∞
i=0 st+i/Ri = RD becomes
st + st+1/(R − 1) = RD, that is,
[st+1 − s] = −(R − 1)[st − s] (39)
Hence we can use (31) in (39) to ﬁnd [st+1 − s] = −Rsδ, and use it in (30) to obtain an expression
pt+1(δ). Using (22) to replace δ(τ) gives
pt+1 =
 





This equation implicitly deﬁnes the solution function pt+1(τ).80 Note ﬁrst that pt+1(0) = 1 for any
γ, hence δ(0) = 0, and pt(0) = 1, and all remaining variables also retain their steady state values.
A unique solution pt+1 (τ) is guaranteed by γ < 1, because the right side is decreasing in pt+1 and










79This is a reasonable characterization of long-run neutrality, because other agents’ spending will revert to steady
state values due to the overlapping generations structure of the model (if λ ≤ (R−1)K). It is also consistent with price
determination by a reserve requirement (footnote 26). We use long-run neutrality as a normalization, because the
forward-looking nature of households’ intertemporal consumption brings about one degree of indeterminacy following
the unexpected shock. Instead of long-run neutrality, we could have assumed that the Euler equation holds across
t − 1 and t in spite of the shock – doing so leads to the same proposed form.
80Explicit solutions can be found for speciﬁc values of γ. γ = 1/2 or 2 admit quadratic solutions.
43Clearly γ < 1 is suﬃcient (not necessary) to guarantee p0
t+1 (τ) > 0 for any τ ∈ [0,1]. The chain
rule performed on (22) then implies δ0 (τ) > 0, because the positive price level eﬀect is weaker than
the negative productivity eﬀect (the elasticity condition (1 − τ)p0
t+1(τ)/pt+1 (τ) < 1 holds). From
(31) then follows that p0
t (τ) < 0. That deﬂation is temporary can also be understood as follows:
since st > 0 implies st+1 < 0 in (39), pt(τ) < 1 also implies pt+1(τ) > 1 in (30).




Replacing s = αy/R (see footnote 27) yields the lower bound of the price level pt, and st = pty in
(32). Using st in (39), we ﬁnd st+1 = s − s(R − 1)[(R/α)1−γ − 1], and use it in (30) to obtain pt+1
in (32). •
3. Deteriorating Balance Sheets and Critical Shocks, Propositions 4 and 7.
Part (a) To show ω (1) > RK+Π, note that δ (1) = 1 and pt(1) = pt ≤ 1 for any γ. Therefore, (26)
implies ω(1) > qH. To show qH > RK + Π, use ﬁrm leverage (17) to replace Π = 1−α
α (R − 1)qH,
and use bank leverage (18) to replace qH = A = RK/(R − 1). Cancelling RK, the inequality
becomes (R − 1)
−1 > 1+(1−α)/α, which holds since α > (R−1). Therefore, ω(1) > RK +Π for
all α and γ considered.
Part (b) With ω(0) = 0 and ω(1) > RK + Π, the continuity of ω(τ) and ω0(τ) guarantees the
existence and ordering of the thresholds 0 < τ0 < τDiv < τK < 1. We can ﬁnd τK and τDiv
explicitly by using in (22) the solutions δDiv and δK found on page 22, 1 − τi = (1 − δi)/pt+1.






, so that δDiv = δ∗/R, δK = δ∗/R+(R − 1)/R, and pt+1 = (1 − δ∗)
γ/(γ−1),
from (32). Thus, the thresholds τi are given by
1 − τDiv = (1 − δ∗/R)/(1 − δ∗)
γ/(γ−1)
1 − τ∗ = (1 − δ∗)
1/(1−γ) (41)
1 − τK = (1 − δ∗)
1/(1−γ) /R
Only for τ0 there is no explicit solution. δ0 is implicitly deﬁned by ω (δ0) = Π. Since δ0 < δDiv, it
follows that τ0 ∈ (0,τDiv).
Part (c) To show that the thresholds in (41) are decreasing in α and γ, note ﬁrst that δ∗ is. In each
case of (41), τi and δ∗ are related positively. Since τi depend on α only through δ∗, it follows that
τ0
i(α) < 0. That also implies τ0
i (γ) < 0, because γ also raises the exponent of (1 − δ∗)
1/(1−γ). The
remaining threshold is implicitly deﬁned by ω (δ(τ0),pt(τ0)) = Π. τ0
0(α) < 0 is shown as follows.
δ(τ) and pt(τ) are independent of α; therefore, higher leverage α increases ω in (26) only through
qH, due to (16). Moreover, Π = (1 − α)y falls. When α is greater ω(α,τ) = Π is reached at
smaller τ, so τ0
0(α) < 0. The same argument applies to γ, since p0
t(γ) < 0. The proof for β = R−1
is very similar. Therefore, τ0
i(α) < 0, τ0
i(β) < 0, and τ0
i(γ) < 0: the greater α, β and γ, the smaller
all thresholds τi. •
44Appendix B: Strategic Default
Debt is enforceable if strategic default can be prevented. Assets cannot be hidden or stolen; the
question of strategic default revolves around whether the ﬁrm’s sales revenue py can be pledged
for the repayment of debt, as in (5), or whether borrowing is conﬁned to the discounted value of
assets, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The latter would result from either of two possible moral
hazard problems. The inalienability of human capital (Hart and Moore 1994) is not a problem
here, because entrepreneurs’ threat to withdraw their speciﬁc labor would not be credible: zero
production implies zero overall consumption. The other possibility is that entrepreneurs secretly
consume their production.81 We shall see that only deposit banking can prevent this form of moral
hazard.
First note that comparing (1) with (4) indeed suggests that entrepreneurs have an incentive to
consume all output, and that doing so implies partial default.82 For them to take advantage of
strategic default, however, they must trade each others’ output around the unit circle (see page 6).
They cannot do so using only IOUs, as they cannot by themselves clear the inﬁnite chain of IOUs
required for the necessary trades (assumption 2). They cannot do so through a deposit banking
system either, because all transactions are taking place on the banking system’s balance sheet, and
transfers from defaulting ﬁrms can be blocked. By contrast, if the economy used outside money
as means of payment, or if the banking system issued circulating bank notes instead of deposits,
defaulting ﬁrms could pay each other using the circulating liability without any need for payment
intermediation by the banking system. These arrangements cannot prevent strategic default, and
lending would not arise in the ﬁrst place. Therefore, only deposit banking overcomes the payments
problem. •
81Much of the literature removes this incentive by assuming either costly bankruptcy whereby defaulting ﬁrms can
only abscond with a fraction of their output (e.g. McAndrews and Roberds 1999), or by introducing auditing or
monitoring with non-pecuniary penalties to emulate unlimited liability (Townsend 1979, and Diamond 1984).
82The asset price in (5) cannot appreciate at the rate of interest, see footnote 16.
45Appendix C: Balance Sheet Mechanics
Every period old ﬁrms leave, and young ﬁrms enter, the bank’s balance sheet. This process can be





RqH − λ RD − st
qtH qtH + st + Divt




RK − λ − Divt
Step t−. Entering period t, the bank’s balance sheets reﬂects loans and deposits with interest due.
Step t. While markets are open during t, four transactions occur:
(1) new ﬁrms borrow qtH, and spend the deposits so obtained on old ﬁrms’ assets.
(2) savers spend st of their deposits on old ﬁrms’ output.
(3) the banking system likewise spends Divt on output.
Old ﬁrms thereby accumulate deposits worth qtH+st+Divt (the middle row). This equals RqH−λ,
which shows that if revenue falls short of RqH, old ﬁrms default. [The equality uses (23), (27) and
(28) and holds for all λ ≥ 0.]
(4) Loan losses are written oﬀ by subtracting λ from both loans and bank capital.
Step t+. The accumulated deposits repay the performing portion of loans: this cancels RqH − λ
on both sides of t. This yields balance sheet t+, which is carried over to period t + 1.
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